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165 
GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES WITH COMPARISON TO 
EUROPE: INNOVATION AND COMPETITION  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate over health care expenditures rages in America. As 
presidential candidates discussed their plans for revamping the health care 
system, the United States makes the largest health expenditures in the 
world, both per capita and as a percentage of gross domestic product.1 
Health care costs constitute an increasing percentage of household 
expenditures, particularly for the elderly.2 While health care costs climb, 
prescription drug costs represent an expanding percentage of the health 
care budget.3 Prescription drug prices thus remain a central concern in the 
health care debate.4 For many of their prescriptions, Americans purchase 
generic versions of prescription drugs, certified by the Food and Drug 
 
 
 1. By 2000, the United States “spent the highest amount on health care in the world ($4,499 per 
capita).” NECLAM SEKHRI & WILLIAM SAVEDOFF, WORLD HEALTH ORG., DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 3, 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/health_financing/private_health_in_dp_04_3.pdf; see also M. L. Burstall, How Do 
They Do It Elsewhere in Europe, in SHOULD PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES BE REGULATED? THE 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BRITISH PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION SCHEME 72, 
72 (David Green ed., 1997) (explaining that “spending on health care has tended to rise more rapidly 
than national income, driven by aging populations, rising expectations and above all by the progress of 
medical science.” (footnote omitted)).  
 2. See Milt Freudenheim, Drug Prices for Elderly Surge Ahead in America, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Aug. 17, 2005, at 15; see also Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United 
States Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89 (2003), available at http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/22/3/89. 
 3. Prescription drugs are the most rapidly increasing expenditure of the entire health care 
system. Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace: 
National Health Expenditures and Their Share of Gross Domestic Product, 1960–2004, 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/ti2004-1-1.cfm. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that from 
1993–2004, national health expenditures doubled to represent nearly sixteen percent of the gross 
domestic product. Id. For a definition of what constitutes a “drug,” see Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2000) (explaining that a drug is a substance that exerts 
an action on the structure or function of the body by chemical action and that is intended for use in the 
treatment or prevention of disease).  
 4. Zvi Griliches & Iain M. Cockburn, Generics and the Producer Price Index for 
Pharmaceuticals, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 19, 19 (Robert 
B. Helms ed., 1996). See also David Green, Editor’s Introduction: Is Price Regulation Necessary?, in 
SHOULD PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES BE REGULATED? supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that “in America 
about 60 percent of pharmaceutical spending is out-of-pocket”). Studies indicate that consumers could 
have saved as much as twenty billion dollars in 2004 by switching to generics. Kirsty Barnes, $20 
Billion in Untapped Generic Drug Savings, Nov. 2, 2005, http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/ 
layout/set/print/content/view/print/91166. 
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Administration (“FDA”) to be sufficient therapeutic substitutes for brand-
name versions of the same chemical compound.5 Economists estimate that 
Americans save eight to ten billion dollars annually by purchasing generic 
alternatives to brand-name pharmaceuticals.6  
In both the United States and Europe, the pharmaceutical industry has 
become a unique regulatory animal. Government agencies hold 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to rigorous evidentiary showings of the 
quality of their products. In the United States, the FDA requires 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to document “proof of safety and 
efficacy.”7 Evidentiary showings necessitate significant pre-market testing 
expenses; when coupled with research and development costs, they 
mandate a huge capital investment to produce innovative drugs. To protect 
this investment and prevent unsafe drugs from entering the market, the 
FDA maintains an exclusivity system—market protections that insulate 
brand-name pharmaceuticals from generic competition for a term, 
typically three or five years.  
The FDA has been criticized for the length of its exclusivity periods, 
which essentially maintain the large pharmaceutical companies’ abilities to 
sell branded medications at a monopoly price for an extended period of 
time. Supporters of the current system have suggested that an alternative 
system would be deleterious to research and safety, permitting 
pharmaceuticals of unknown effectiveness onto the market. Indeed, the 
FDA requires a laborious approval process and years of legal wrangling 
before a generic prescription drug enters the marketplace.  
The European prescription drug regulatory system provides an 
interesting contrast to the American process. Despite its comprehensive 
regulatory framework in which a centralized regulatory body mandates 
drug regulations, the European system does not regulate a single market 
 
 
 5. Griliches & Cockburn, supra note 4, at 21. The FDA certifies products as “therapeutically 
equivalent” if they are:  
1) pharmaceutically equivalent, in that they contain the same active ingredient(s), are of the 
same dosage form, are identical in strength and route of administration, and meet applicable 
standards of purity and quality; 2) bioequivalent, in that in vivo or in vitro tests show that a 
product meets statistical criteria for equivalence to . . . [the] extent of absorption of the active 
ingredient and its availability at the site of action; 3) adequately labeled; and 4) manufactured 
in compliance with Current Good Manufacturing Practice regulations. 
Id. 
 6. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, Office of Generic Drugs, 
What Are Generic Drugs?, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd (scroll down to “What are Generic Drugs?”) 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2008).  
 7. HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: 
BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 9 (1983) (explaining the loss of efficiency due to stringent 
approval procedures). 
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for pharmaceuticals.8 Unlike the United States, which lets the open market 
determine prices, individual European states regulate the prices of 
pharmaceuticals through single-payer state health systems.9 But while EU 
countries set the market prices for pharmaceuticals by setting the amounts 
their state health systems will pay, the Europeans maintain longer 
exclusivity protections for innovator pharmaceuticals. Due to the unique 
subsidization of the European pharmaceutical industry, Europe has been 
criticized as creating a lack of pricing competence at the Community level, 
leading to a less robust, less competitive pharmaceuticals market.10  
II. BACKGROUND OF PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Consciousness-raising during the Progressive Era regarding the poor 
state of food and drug quality led to the early twentieth century 
development of federal regulatory bodies and the modern tort system.11 
The 1906 passage of the Federal Food and Drugs Act began the modern 
era of pharmaceutical regulation in the United States.12 The Act created 
the Bureau of Chemistry, the predecessor to the modern FDA, which took 
its current name in 1930.13 For the first three decades of its existence, the 
FDA primarily regulated the labeling of medications, gearing enforcement 
against product misrepresentation.14 However, in 1937, a fatal and largely 
 
 
 8. GOVIN PERMANAND, EU PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY-
MAKING 6 (2006) [hereinafter EU PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION]. Govin Permanand explains a 
political rationale behind the fragmentation of the pharmaceutical market in Europe, as a centralization 
thereof would mean “industry rationalisation and job losses—undoubtedly favouring the more 
established and global-oriented member state industries . . . .” Id. See also Govin Permanand, 
Regulating Under Constraint: The Case of European Union Pharmaceutical Policy (2002) 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of London: London School of Economics & Political 
Science) (on file with author).  
 9. Burstall, supra note 1, at 73.  
 10. EU PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION, supra note 8, at 195. See also ALFONSO 
GAMBARDELLA ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, ENTERPRISE DIRECTORATE-GEN., GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 7 (2000), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/library/enterprise-papers/pdf/enterprise_paper_01_2001.pdf. 
 11. See PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 35–71 (2003).  
 12. For a complete discussion of the history of the FDA, see id. at 53 (explaining that the Act 
was the first to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to label their medications correctly in an attempt 
to make sure that the contents were not “adulterated or impure”).  
 13. John P. Swann, History of the FDA: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, 
Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/fulltext.html (last visited Jan. 13, 
2009). 
 14. Id. See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911) (holding that a label claiming a tonic 
to be cancer-curing is not “misbranding” under the meaning of the Food and Drug Act; this case 
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untested new cough syrup, Elixir Sulfanilamide, led to the deaths of over 
107 Americans.15 This nationally publicized tragedy led to the passage of 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1938, which provided the framework 
for comprehensive regulation of pharmaceutical production and sales in 
the United States.16 This Act and its later amendments create a lengthy 
regulatory approval process for new drugs to pass before being placed on 
the market.17 For a new drug, this process requires FDA approval through 
a process now called the New Drug Application (“NDA”).  
In the United States, private pharmaceutical companies and universities 
became the primary producers of new chemical entities (“NCEs”).18 
Pharmaceuticals, like any other new product, are eligible for patent 
protection under American patent law, ensuring a legal remedy against 
infringement.19 Patent protection requires that the inventor apply within 
one year of the new creation entering the public domain; for 
pharmaceuticals, this means that the manufacturer must apply for patent 
protection within one year of beginning the FDA regulatory process.20 
Once a new pharmaceutical has been discovered and has gone through 
pre-clinical trials, the manufacturer must file an investigational NDA with 
the FDA.21 Then a series of human testing programs take place in three 
categories: toxicology, effectiveness, and—finally—human testing on a 
 
 
demonstrated the continuation of the status quo of caveat emptor in the pharmaceutical industry, 
despite Progressive attempts to regulate the industry).  
 15. HILTS, supra note 11, at 89–93. 
 16. Id. at 93. 
 17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2000), providing that the FDA must have sufficient information 
to determine the drug’s safety and efficacy through both preclinical and clinical studies; see also 
DOUGLAS J. PISANO & DAVID MANTUS, FDA REGULATORY AFFAIRS: A GUIDE FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS, MEDICAL DEVICES, AND BIOLOGICS 7 (2004) (explaining the FDA’s modern orientation: “It is 
a scientifically based law enforcement agency whose mission is to safeguard public health and to 
ensure honesty and fairness between the consumer and health-regulated industries, involved with 
pharmaceuticals, devices, and biologics” (citing S. STRAUSS, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: AN 
OVERVIEW, STRAUSS’ FEDERAL DRUG LAWS AND EXAMINATION REVIEW 323 (5th ed. 1999))).  
 18. GRABOWSKI, supra note 7, at 18–19 (explaining that since the early 1950s American 
pharmaceutical firms have produced over ninety percent of the nation’s NCEs, and from 1963 to 1975 
they produced over fifty percent of the world’s total).  
 19. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention 
and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into 
the United States . . . .”). 
 20. Mary Atkinson, Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals: A Comparative Study of the Law in 
the United States and Canada, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 181, 184 n.18 (2002).  
 21. GRABOWSKI & VERNON supra note 7, at 22 (“The FDA’s decision to permit clinical testing 
is based on the following considerations: (1) the protection of the human research subject, (2) the 
adequacy of animal studies already completed, (3) the scientific merits of the research plan, and (4) the 
qualifications of the investigator.”). 
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large patient population.22 These tests can take as long as four to six 
years.23 Having passed that series of testing, the drug manufacturer has to 
submit a new drug application for review by the FDA, a process which in 
itself can require additional time.24 In all, the regulatory process, from 
product creation to the marketplace, entails laborious and time-consuming 
testing and regulation. 
The pioneering pharmaceuticals of the 1960s and 1970s were given 
long exclusivity protection terms; yet, as development time increased, 
exclusivity periods were decreased.25 Generic pharmaceuticals present a 
different regulatory issue—they contain the same active ingredients as 
pioneer drugs already tested and reviewed by the FDA.26 However, into 
the 1980s, manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals were required to 
perform the same expensive testing that the pioneer drug makers had 
already undergone.27 These barriers perhaps contributed to the public 
scandals in the 1970s and 1980s of generic manufacturers cutting corners 
and attempting to bribe FDA officials to gain entry into the market.28  
As a result, Congress attempted to level the playing field for generic 
pharmaceuticals and encourage competition through the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the “Hatch-
Waxman Act”).29 The Act established a new process for generic drugs to 
enter the market, the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).30 
Congress intended the Act to “make available more low-cost generic drugs 
by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs first 
approved after 1962.”31 However, with the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress 
also sought to balance the ability of competitors to bring cheap generics to 
the marketplace with the need for companies producing brand-name drugs 
 
 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 23.  
 24. Id. at 22–23. 
 25. Id. at 22–24 (explaining that patent lives decreased on average 4.3 years between 1966 and 
1979). 
 26. United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 454–55 (1983) (noting that the Supreme 
Court defined a generic as “a product that contains the same active ingredients but not necessarily the 
same excipients as a so-called ‘pioneer drug’ that is marketed under a brand name”).  
 27. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, Part I, at 16–17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.  
 28. PISANO & MANTUS, supra note 17, at 5. 
 29. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 21 U.S.C. 355(j) (2000). 
 30. The Generic Drug Maze: Speeding Access to Affordable Life-Saving Drugs: Hearing Before 
the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 83 (2006) (statement of Mark Merritt, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Pharmaceutical Care Management Association) [hereinafter Hearing]. For 
the text of the Hatch–Waxman Amendments to the Act in 1984, called the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in 
relevant part at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000)).  
 31. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, supra note 27, at 14. 
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to research and develop new pharmaceuticals.32 To accomplish the first 
objective, the Hatch-Waxman Act’s ANDA provided generics with a new 
approval process, during which generic producers need only prove the 
equivalency of their generic product to the pioneer drug on which FDA 
testing and approval had already taken place.33 This was intended to allow 
generic manufacturers to avoid the enormous costs inherent in duplicating 
the NDA process, particularly the expensive data on human subjects.34 The 
Act also gave generic manufacturers the opportunity to petition for generic 
drugs that list different drugs as the active ingredient or have a different 
dosage or strength, provided that the change does not require a separate 
review of clinical data.35 Additionally, Hatch-Waxman aimed to maintain 
investment in research and development of new innovator 
pharmaceuticals.36 To this end, the Act established two new FDA 
pharmaceutical approval processes: the ANDA and the Section 505(b)(2) 
application.37 These approval processes allow manufacturers of equivalent 
pharmaceuticals, similar but non-equivalent pharmaceuticals, and 
pharmaceuticals for which significant safety and efficacy testing have 
been heretofore conducted by third parties to avoid duplicative innovator 
research and to develop products during innovator exclusivity periods.38 
To aid concurrent development of generics, the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments also allowed generic manufacturers to use the patented 
pioneer drug during the patent life to test and develop generics, which 
might otherwise be patent infringement.39 Thus, proprietary pioneer drugs 
 
 
 32. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002). For a discussion of the 
rationale behind the Hatch-Waxman Act, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 56 (2006) (explaining that, 
through Hatch-Waxman, Congress sought to accomplish its objectives by better coordinating the 
patent system and the FDA’s regulatory system, and by limiting “the dangers of monopoly associated 
with both systems of regulation”). 
 33. Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-
Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufactures, 58 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 51, 54 (2003). The FDA maintains a list of its already approved branded and generic 
pharmaceuticals. This list, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, 
commonly known as the “Orange Book,” is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/orange/default.htm. 
See also Watson Pharms., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445 (D. Md. 2001) (explaining that 
federal courts have ruled that the FDA plays merely a “ministerial” role in creating the Orange Book, 
rather than acting as the arbiter of the scope or validity of patent claims). 
 34. Mary W. Bourke & M. Edward Danberg, Current Trends in Hatch-Waxman Patent 
Litigation: A System Still in Flux, in PHARMACEUTICAL LAW 2006: ACROSS THE PRODUCT LIFE 
CYCLE 939, 952–53 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 2006).  
 35. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C). 
 36. See aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 230.  
 37. See Hearing, supra note 30, at 83. 
 38. Id. at 74. 
 39. Soehnge, supra note 33, at 54. 
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and their testing data were made available to generic manufacturers, 
allowing the manufacturers to put a competitor pharmaceutical on the 
market sooner. 
However, in accordance with the first goal of maintaining the 
incentives for research and development, several restrictions on 
competition were included in the Hatch-Waxman Act. First, pioneer drugs, 
those with NCEs new to the market, receive a five-year exclusivity period, 
during which time no ANDA may be submitted.40 When generic 
manufacturers wish to market a bioequivalent, the Act requires that 
producers notify the corresponding pioneer pharmaceutical’s patent 
owners of a possible exclusivity infringement so that the issue may be 
litigated promptly.41  
Once a generic manufacturer files an ANDA, if a patent infringement 
action is brought within forty-five days after notice of final certification, 
approval is stayed for thirty months, or until a court decides that the patent 
is not infringed.42 If after thirty months no federal court has ruled on the 
validity of the patent infringement, the generic manufacturer who filed the 
ANDA may distribute and market the drug; however, the ANDA filer that 
chooses to follow this course may thereafter become liable for 
infringement damages if infringement is found later by a court.43  
Once a generic pharmaceutical has filed for final ANDA certification, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the marketer of the generic drug 180 days of 
 
 
 40. See Bourke & Danberg, supra note 34, at 968. See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2008) (“New 
chemical entity means a drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by FDA in any 
other application . . . .”). 
 41. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2000). 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 43. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (Cipro I), 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001). The courts have also ruled that even if litigation over the patent infringement extends 
for longer than the thirty-month protection provided by the statute, the generic drug may nevertheless 
enter the market. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)) (upholding a generic manufacturer’s 
use of a patented brand-name prescription for research purposes during the patent term, so as to not 
create a de facto patent term extension in which time the generic would be developed). See also In re 
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). For a complete 
discussion of the Bolar decision, see James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 433, 447–48, 462–63 (1986). However, note that the federal courts have also held that a generic 
manufacturer’s exclusivity period could not prevent competition from the brand-name manufacturer 
producing its own, unbranded generic version of the pioneer drug to compete with its own drug as well 
as with the competitor’s generic. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 454 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2006). The 
Fourth Circuit held that the Hatch-Waxman Act did not prohibit the manufacturer of a brand-name 
drug from marketing an authorized generic version of the drug through a third-party licensee during 
the 180-day exclusivity period afforded to the first generic manufacturer under paragraph IV of the 
ANDA. Id. at 276.  
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market exclusivity for that generic.44 In implementing this provision of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, however, the FDA determined that the provision 
could not be read literally; it then added the requirement that the first 
applicant must have “successfully defended against a suit for patent 
infringement” before the exclusivity period can begin to run.45 Thus the 
FDA inserted an additional hurdle of litigation before the generic 
manufacturer can enjoy the 180-day exclusivity period.46 Furthermore, 
federal courts have limited the 180-day generic exclusivity period, 
allowing the producer of the innovator drug (the NDA holder) to market 
its own generic version of the drug during the ANDA holder’s 180-day 
exclusivity period.47 Thus, during their period of supposed exclusivity, 
generic manufacturers may have to defend patent infringement suits and 
face generic competition from the innovator drug producer, a company 
already equipped and engaged in the manufacture of the same 
pharmaceutical.  
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides the section 505(b)(2) application 
for innovative pharmaceuticals that offer a new therapeutic benefit or 
alternative for consumers.48 In essence, section 505(b)(2) constitutes a 
hybrid between the NDA and ANDA processes, allowing applicants to 
avoid duplicative research for drugs that would not qualify as 
bioequivalents for the ANDA process. Section 505(b)(2) provides this 
alternative for two types of drugs: drugs that cannot be approved solely on 
the basis of studies conducted or compensated by the applicant and drugs 
that are similar to innovators but not sufficiently similar to constitute 
therapeutic equivalents.49 In practice, section 505(b)(2) applications are 
used by producers of NCEs and new molecular entities (“NMEs”) that rely 
 
 
 44. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000, Supp. III, 2003): 
[F]or a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing such a 
certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days after the date 
of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including the commercial marketing of the 
listed drug) by any first applicant. 
 45. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1), the FDA regulations in addition to the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
implementing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 46. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing former 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.107(c)(1)). 
 47. See Mylan Pharm., 454 F.3d at 276; Abbreviated New Drug Application, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see also Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 48. Julie Dohm, Expanding the Scope of Hatch-Waxman Act’s Patent Carve-out Exception to the 
Identical Drug Labeling Requirement: Closing the Patent Litigation Loophole, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
151, 155 (2007). 
 49. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(b)(2), DRAFT GUIDANCE (1999), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/Cder/Guidance/2853dft.htm [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDANCE].  
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on FDA findings or studies to which the applicant has not been afforded a 
right of reference.50 Also, section 505(b)(2) applications are used by 
producers of pharmaceuticals that modify previously approved drugs, 
creating equivalents not similar enough to warrant the approval of an 
ANDA.51 A section 505(b)(2) applicant pharmaceutical may receive a 
five-year exclusivity period for an NCE or NME; if the drug is not an 
NCE, and one or more of the clinical studies was conducted or sponsored 
by the applicant, the section 505(b)(2) applicant can receive a three-year 
exclusivity period.52 The section 505(b)(2) applicant may also be eligible 
for orphan drug or pediatric exclusivity.53  
Furthermore, a brand-name drug manufacturer that takes 
anticompetitive measures beyond the FDA-prescribed windows of market 
exclusivity can face antitrust liability in the American system. The 
Sherman Act punishes all behavior that “attempt[s] to monopolize” in 
restraint of trade, aiming to protect competition in a market, and thus the 
consumer, rather than merely the rights of the competitor.54 In this regard, 
federal courts have found that brand-name drug manufacturers attempting 
to block generic entry through unfounded lawsuits would be guilty of 
antitrust violations.55 Holding that filing frivolous lawsuits constitutes an 
 
 
 50. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (text of definition added by Applications for Approval to 
Market a New Drug, Fed. Reg. 39, 588, 39, 607 (July 10, 2008)) (“Right of reference or use means the 
authority to rely upon, and otherwise use, an investigation for the purpose of obtaining approval of an 
application, including the ability to make available the underlying raw data from the investigation for 
FDA audit, if necessary.”). A right of reference is a written statement signed by the owner of the 
referenced raw data that authorizes the applicant to use, in support of its submission to the FDA, data 
that provide the basis for each investigation submitted in its application. See DONALD O. BEERS, 
GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS, app. 34 (2004).  
 51. Equivalent to the NDA process, section 505(b)(2) applicants must demonstrate the safety and 
efficacy of their pharmaceuticals. However, as with the ANDA process, a section 505(b)(2) 
application may “piggyback” on existing studies and FDA findings for similar pharmaceuticals. 
Dohm, supra note 48, at 155. Section 505(b)(2) applications may rely on “one or more” studies which 
“were not conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a right of 
reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigations were conducted.” DRAFT 
GUIDANCE, supra note 49; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2000). Section 505(b)(2) expressly permits the 
applicant and FDA to rely on data not developed by the applicant, and to which the applicant does not 
possess a right of reference. According to the FDA, this information may include published literature 
or general information when an applicant has not obtained a right of reference, or the FDA’s “previous 
finding of safety and effectiveness” for an approved drug. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 49. 
 52. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(4)(iv); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2). 
 53. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–ee (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(d)(23). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2000). American antitrust law is governed by the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–7 (2000). 
 55. See In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that 
the brand-name drug maker filed patent suits against generic competitors merely as a sham to delay 
generic competition; antitrust liability and treble damages were upheld in a $220 million settlement 
against Bristol-Myers Squibb).  
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antitrust violation rather than a minor violation of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure perhaps demonstrates the federal judiciary’s 
acknowledgement of the time required for effective marketing and for a 
consumer to switch to generics.  
III. DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECTS OF AMERICAN GENERIC 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION 
In the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, initial research and 
development is a highly inefficient and prohibitively expensive process; 
required pharmaceutical testing and human studies can take upwards of 
several years and are extremely expensive.56 The cost required for a 
pioneer manufacturer to research and develop a new pharmaceutical, much 
less an NCE, is substantial. The vast majority of money spent on research 
and development of new pharmaceuticals results in the creation of 
unusable, unmarketable chemicals.57 Thus, only a small minority of the 
pharmaceuticals that reach the marketplace turn a profit.58 Furthermore, 
while a company is attempting to find one of the few NCEs that will be 
therapeutically effective and marketable for a relatively common ailment, 
other companies may be working concurrently, winning the race to get the 
drugs in clinical trials and patented. Even those drugs that are successfully 
 
 
 However, the Second Circuit in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation declared a “reverse 
payment” in a patent litigation settlement agreement—that is, an exchange of money from a brand-
name pharmaceutical manufacturer to a generic competitor that effectively ends the generic 
manufacturer’s ANDA application—to be legitimate and not in violation of the Sherman Act. 466 F.3d 
187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006). The court held that reverse payments are not “per se violations of the 
Sherman Act such that an allegation of an agreement to make reverse payments suffices to assert an 
antitrust violation.” Id. The court ruled that it “[did] not think the fact that the patent holder is paying 
to protect its patent monopoly, without more, establishes a Sherman Act violation.” Id. See also 
Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes 
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 
1807 (2003).  
 55. Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent 
Settlements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of the Fed. 
Trade Comm., Molly Boast, Dir., Bureau of Competition), available at http://www.ftc.gov/05/ 
2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 237–40. 
 56. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, 
RISKS, AND REWARDS 39–46 (1993). 
 57. GRABOWSKI & VERNON supra note 7, at 22, fig.4. Scholars estimate attrition rates in the 
chemical lab, before any preclinical animal studies, to be at least ten to one. This means that for every 
ten NCEs contrived and created for the first time, nine are eliminated as ineffective before any studies 
on their therapeutic effectiveness have begun. Id.  
 58. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 237–40.  
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developed and have passed clinical trials may fail to be the first of their 
kind.59  
Pharmaceutical companies often point to a Tufts University study that 
found the pre-tax cost of new drug development to be $897 million, 
including $403 million of purported “opportunity costs” of drug 
development.60 In addition, the research and development process has 
become increasingly expensive over time, as costs have risen dramatically 
without a proportional increase in the number of new drugs.61  
Once development, success in the regulatory process, and patent 
protection of a new drug have been achieved, the pharmaceutical 
companies must bring the drug to market—often facing the prospect of 
creating a new market for the drug.62 It is estimated that only three of ten 
pharmaceuticals even earn back the average cost of research and 
development.63 This market environment has created such a large upfront 
 
 
 59. Id. at 68 (noting that initial investments are made by a firm attempting to create innovative 
pharmaceutical products without knowing whether or not it would “win the patent race” by getting its 
products through the FDA approval process before other companies developing similar new 
pharmaceuticals get theirs patented). 
 60. Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Total Cost to Develop a New Prescription Drug, 
Including Cost of Post-Approval Research, Is $897 Million (May 13, 2003), http://csdd.tufts.edu/ 
NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=29. “Some estimates exceed 300 million required to produce a 
marketable drug that will take eight to twelve years to produce.” Griliches & Cockburn, supra note 4, 
at 19. But see Daniel L. Pollock, Blame Canada (and the Rest of the World): The Twenty-Year War on 
Imported Prescription Drugs, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 345 (2006) (explaining that other studies 
have noted that “U.S. taxpayer-funded researchers conducted 55 percent of the published research 
projects leading to the discovery and development of” top selling pharmaceuticals (citing BOB YOUNG 
ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, RX R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG 
INDUSTRY’S R&D “SCARE CARD” 7–8 (July 2001), available at http://www.citizen/org/docments/ 
acfdc.pdf)). See also The Pharmaceutical Industry: Beyond the Pill, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2007, 
at 76 [hereinafter ECONOMIST] (stating that research & development expenditures on pharmaceuticals 
were sixty-four billion dollars in 2006, with only thirteen new pharmaceuticals approved by the 
regulator).  
 61. Rebecca Henderson & Iain M. Cockburn, The Determinants of Research Productivity in 
Ethical Drug Discovery, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 167.  
 62. BERNICE SCHACTER, THE NEW MEDICINES: HOW DRUGS ARE CREATED, APPROVED, 
MARKETED, AND SOLD, 181–93 (2006). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 144–45 (explaining that 
marketing costs often double the cost of research and development). These expenditures are spent both 
on physician marketing (i.e., marketing to those professionals and institutions that prescribe 
pharmaceuticals to their patients) and on direct-to-consumer marketing (i.e., marketing by those whose 
efforts promote pharmaceuticals directly to the consumer). Id. at 154–64. See also Jim Edwards, 
Where There's a Pill, There's a Way, BRAND WEEK, May 16, 2005, http://www.brandweek.com/bw/ 
esearch/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_Id.=1000920676 (stating that four billion dollars are spent on 
consumer advertisements each year, not including the large amount spent on free samples of the 
medications). See also James Kanter, Free-for-All over Generic Drugs in Europe, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Nov. 15, 2005, at 15 (according to Stewart Adkins of Lehman Brothers, “[o]n both sides of the 
Atlantic, drug companies spend about 50 percent more promoting product awareness than they do for 
research and development”).  
 63. Griliches & Cockburn, supra note 4, at 19.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:165 
 
 
 
 
cost for developing pharmaceuticals and bringing them to the marketplace 
that manufacturers have come to believe only top-selling drugs are “worth 
the investment.”64 Sales of the top fifteen drugs are heavily dominated by 
American companies, controlling some eighty-eight percent of the 
market.65  
Perhaps because the FDA encourages the fungible image of 
pharmaceuticals through its aforementioned process of certifying generics 
as therapeutic bioequivalents to their Orange Book brand-name drugs, the 
majority of consumers internalize this message and eventually switch from 
a branded pharmaceutical to a generic.66 This may be expected of any 
rational consumer, “considering that generic versions sell at discounts of 
30 percent to 50 percent below the price of the branded products.”67 
Generic producers often reach a fifty percent quantity share of a 
pharmaceutical market within a year after the exclusivity period expires.68 
However, the fact that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers maintain 
as significant a market share as they do presents an interesting problem: 
why would consumers continue to purchase a pioneer drug if they can buy 
the generic for half the price?69 The answer lies in the economic factors 
underlying the market for pharmaceuticals, and the failure of the 
regulatory regime to effect a transition to less expensive generics in the 
face of a favorable demand environment.  
Clearly, as with the market for any other product, NDA holders possess 
a first-mover advantage in the marketplace, which helps them retain a 
large market share; first-movers benefit from brand loyalty and the price 
insensitivity inherent in the prescribing physician’s choice of the original 
 
 
 64. SCHACTER, supra note 62, at 224 (explaining that drug manufacturers since the 1980s have 
come to believe that only a drug—such as a Celebrex, Viagra, or Lipitor—“bringing in $300 million in 
sales by the third year of marketing is worth the investment”). 
 65. See GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 10, at 36. American dominance in the top-fifteen drug 
market greatly exceeds that of pharmaceutical patents (by around thirty percent) or top fifty NCE 
creation (by around fifty percent). Id. 
 66. Griliches & Cockburn, supra note 4, at 19, 21. 
 67. Id. at 19. See also Hearing, supra note 30, at 79 (explaining that “the brand and generic 
differential is on average $60–$80 per prescription”). However a patient’s adoption of a generic 
bioequivalent may be the result of the impetus of the insurance provider, pharmacy, or prescribing 
physician instead of merely the patient’s personal preference towards purchasing a less expensive 
brand of pharmaceutical.  
 68. Griliches & Cockburn, supra note 4, at 19. Because the pharmaceuticals are selling for thirty 
to fifty percent less, reaching a fifty percent quantity share of the market is distinguished from 
reaching a majority of the profits in the market.  
 69. See id. at 25–26. Even after three years on the market (1990–1992) generic Prazosin had yet 
to reach a sixty percent quantity share of the market, despite the fact that the price of the generic was at 
that point on average seventy-five percent less than that of its brand-name counterpart. Id.  
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brand-name drug.70 Loyal customers then reward branded drugs for their 
first-mover advantage by continuing to pay higher prices after the entry of 
generics into the market.71 For these reasons, establishing a reputation—
among doctors, pharmacists, and patients—as the first pharmaceutical to 
treat a therapeutic need has been historically as important for the pioneer 
manufacturer in securing profits as maintaining a patent.72 Thus, this first-
mover advantage helps retain market share in spite of the fact that, having 
succeeded in the ANDA process, a generic drug has been certified to be 
equally as safe and effective as the pioneer drug of whose chemical 
ingredients it often consists.73  
While the familiarity and loyalty of physicians and patients to a pioneer 
drug may be an important factor, a large part of the pioneer 
pharmaceuticals’ market retention may stem from the success of their 
manufacturers’ rent-seeking behavior. Brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers invest in some of America’s most expensive marketing 
campaigns to create an illusion that the brand-name drug, despite being 
declared a bioequivalent of the generic by the FDA, remains a superior 
product with a greater therapeutic quality in the eyes of the consumer.74 
Rent-seeking behavior as a means of maintaining a first-mover advantage 
after the introduction of generic competitors may help explain pioneer 
manufacturers’ widely disproportionate rate of advertising to research and 
development expenditures.75  
 
 
 70. Lacy Glen Thomas III, Industrial Policy and International Competitiveness in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 107, 121. This provides a 
“regime of appropriation” that allows pioneer drug manufacturers to gather significant rents from their 
innovations, allowing for returns above and beyond their investment in research and development. Id.  
 71. See id.  
 72. Id. at 127. 
 73. For a comparison with over-the-counter drugs, see Analgesic Markers in a Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1986, at D1. While this market effect can be difficult to conceptualize, an analogy 
could easily be made to over-the-counter pain relievers—despite the introduction of lower-cost generic 
competitors, acetaminophen purchasers remained loyal to Tylenol. Id. See also Griliches & Cockburn, 
supra note 4, at 25. Given the difference in price between a brand-name and generic product, the 
continued purchasing of the branded product suggests that many consumers have different 
expectations of a generic drug, despite the FDA’s certification of its bioequivalence. Id.  
 74. Joseph M. Jadlow, Commentary, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 76, 78. For a 
recent example of such a campaign, see Pfizer’s recent use of Dr. Robert Jarvik to help fend off the 
projected losses to generic rivals of the cholesterol fighter Lipitor, its most widely prescribed and 
profitable drug, whose patent is scheduled to expire by 2010. Stephanie Saul & Alex Berenson, Lipitor 
Maker Digs in to Fight Generic Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at A1. The Economist estimates 
Pfizer will lose some thirteen billion dollars in revenue a year from generic competition biting into its 
Lipitor profits, despite this campaign. ECONOMIST, supra note 60, at 76.  
 75. See id. (estimating that twenty percent of revenues are spent on research and development, 
while over one-third of revenues are spent on marketing efforts).  
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By contrast, generic manufacturers seldom advertise their products 
because generics cannot be marketed under the branded pharmaceutical’s 
trade name, which remains with the original patent holder; instead 
generics must use the chemical name.76 Because generic manufacturers are 
given such a short window in which they have a monopoly over the 
generic drug, generic manufacturers face a collective action problem in 
advertising—were a generic manufacturer to launch a series of 
advertisements for its product, other generic manufacturers, including the 
branded drug manufacturer producing its own generic, would be able to 
“free ride” on the publicity given that pharmaceutical by the advertising 
campaign.77 Predictably, the length of the monopolization period for 
brand-name drug manufacturers results in colossal advertising 
expenditures, while the short exclusivity period (during which the first 
generic manufacturer can still face competition from both the initial 
producer’s brand-name drug and its generic equivalent) available to the 
generic manufacturer results in minimal advertising and the maintenance 
of a considerable percentage of the market going to the brand-name 
pharmaceutical, despite the fact that the FDA has certified the generic as 
the therapeutic equivalent to the brand-name drug. The system of 
regulatory controls pushes valuable social resources into rent-seeking 
prospective marketing by the brand-name drug manufacturers to maintain 
monopoly pricing, squandering those funds available for further research 
and development.  
Because of the regulatory and market incentives given to the innovator, 
pharmaceutical companies benefit far more by developing their own NCEs 
and new categories of products than by creating competitive products 
similar to those already in the marketplace.78 For this reason, American 
firms are the first to enter most new lines of pharmaceutical products.79 
The regulatory environment incentivizes lateral innovation, pushing drug 
manufacturers into new lines of products to sell to much the same market 
of patients.  
However, creating these new categories of pharmaceutical products 
ignores the possibility that alternative products may function more 
 
 
 76. EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 153. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Thomas, supra note 70, at 120. A case involving some of the most commonly prescribed 
pharmaceuticals in the country exhibited this phenomenon: in the market for cardiovascular products, 
the prior cementation of the extremely lucrative beta-blocker markets by a handful of big 
pharmaceutical products led to very limited competition in terms of new beta-blockers, but fueled the 
development of new fields of cardiovascular products to treat heart failure, such as ACE inhibitors. Id. 
 79. Id.  
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effectively at controlling the same problem. The efficacy and safety of 
these product categories has already been approved in the NDA process by 
the FDA, suggesting that development in this category would require less 
expense and less testing to create an effective and safe product. The 
competition between various pharmaceuticals in the same product 
category would increase competition, reduce prices for consumers, and 
provide consumers greater utility from their chosen pharmaceuticals; 
consumers could choose, from among similar products, those that better fit 
their medication regimen or result in fewer undesirable side effects.80 A 
socially beneficial regulatory regime may concentrate on developing the 
value of this intra-market regulation for consumers.81  
The system of generic pharmaceutical regulation in the United States 
seems to exaggerate the first-mover advantages of brand-name 
manufacturers, but does so in a rapidly changing environment. These 
manufacturers face rising costs for the production of innovative products.82 
Yet some argue that because of the poor average returns in the 
pharmaceutical market, surviving in that market requires the accumulation 
of skill and knowledge in a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer, 
resulting in a more efficient industry.83 Every exclusivity system values 
innovation and the production of new products and categories of products; 
yet, in a declining profitability environment for NCEs, manufacturers of 
branded pharmaceuticals seem to be entering into a new era in which most 
profits will be driven by innovations in marketing drugs for new 
therapeutic uses and to new demographics rather than through research 
and development towards the creation of new “wonder drugs” that cure 
widespread, currently perceived medical problems.84 The American 
regulatory system is not designed for this new environment—the regime 
protects brand-name manufacturers with long exclusivity periods to shield 
 
 
 80. EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 56 (“Me-too products reflect and create competition among drug 
and device manufacturers, and that competition is also a powerful driver of better quality and lower 
cost.” (quoting Thomas H. Lee, Me-Too Products—Friend or Foe?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 211 
(2004))). 
 81. See id. at 125 (discussing that an appropriate industrial policy encourages firms to adopt 
strategies that create value for consumers in the long run and punishes firms that offer inferior or 
uninnovative products).  
 82. Barrie G. James, The Pharmaceutical Industry in 2010, in HEALTH CARE 2010: HEALTH 
CARE DELIVERY, THERAPIES, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, 49, 49–66 (C. Bezold & K. 
Knabner eds., 1994) (explaining that the pharmaceutical market is evolving into an industry in which 
“new” and “innovative” products that are more therapeutically effective might not boost profits; rather, 
the success of market actors is increasingly driven by cost containment in the production process and 
pricing).  
 83. Thomas, supra note 70, at 121. 
 84. James, supra note 82, at 54–56. 
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their flagship pioneer drugs. This entrenches brand-name manufacturers 
and supposed biochemical innovation, while in reality the pharmaceutical 
industry is transforming into a price- and marketing-driven environment. 
The protection of politically powerful drug manufacturers and the 
enshrinement of quasi-innovation necessarily comes at the expense of the 
consumer, who primarily seeks low-cost generic alternatives and 
innovative new applications for existing drugs in new populations. 
IV. THE GENERIC PHARMACETUICAL REGULATORY SCHEME IN EUROPE 
The European Union has taken a markedly different approach to 
pharmaceutical regulation while facing many of the same social, political, 
economic, and scientific hurdles as the United States. As in the United 
States, health care costs have increased substantially in the European 
Union, driven by an extremely expansive, technologically sophisticated 
market for pharmaceuticals.85 And perhaps more so than in the United 
States, European countries have sought to use pharmaceutical spending as 
a means of controlling these rising health care costs.86 European state 
governments, like those of almost every First World country besides the 
United States, engage in heavy regulation of pharmaceutical prices; price 
regulation is more easily facilitated in a single-payer public health system 
through which almost all prescription drugs are publicly disseminated.87 
The European state governments, because they themselves are purchasing 
the drugs for their respective populations, have sought to cut down their 
own prescription drug bills through the purchase of generics, resulting in 
substantial savings for taxpayers.88  
While policy decisions on health care spending are decidedly a 
Member State-dominated practice, an overarching regulatory body 
controls the licensing of pharmaceutical products across the common 
market.89 The political rationale behind the creation of a common 
 
 
 85. See also Burstall, supra note 1, at 72–87 (explaining that spending on health care in Europe 
has risen “more rapidly than national income, driven by aging populations, rising expectations and 
above all by the progress of medical science” (footnote omitted)). 
 86. Kanter, supra note 62.  
 87. Green, supra note 4, at 1. For a discussion of the varying forms of price regulation across the 
European Union, see PERMANAND, supra note 8, at 233 (citing Monique Mrazek & Elias Mossialos, 
Regulating Pharmaceutical Prices in the European Union, in REGULATING PHARMACEUTICALS IN 
EUROPE: STRIVING FOR EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND QUALITY 114–29 (Elias Mossialos et al. eds., 
2004)).  
 88. See Kanter, supra note 62 (explaining that France has reduced its annual drug bill by $468 
million over the last three years by purchasing more generic products). 
 89. See Burstall, supra note 1, at 72. The Treaty of Rome left the financing of health care to 
individual Member States, allowing them to act as they see fit within broad limits, as upheld by the 
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regulatory system mirrors that behind the American regulatory scheme: 
the system resulted from public outrage over the havoc caused by the use 
of an unsafe pharmaceutical (Thalidomide) in the early 1960s.90  
The Thalidomide scare began a wave of regulation in Western Europe, 
resulting in the 1965 Guidelines for Medicines.91 However, 
pharmaceutical companies hoping to license their products’ safety and 
efficacy were encumbered by separate approval processes in the separate 
Member States.92 The problem was rectified through the creation of a 
regulatory body for the entire European Economic Community, the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, known since 
2004 as the European Medicines Agency (“EMEA”), which is similar to 
the FDA but in a supranational regional conception.93  
The European Commission provided the means through which 
manufacturers could certify the efficacy of their drugs with the EMEA and 
present them to the marketplace.94 Like in the United States, brand-name 
drugs were given exclusivity protection to allow their manufacturers to 
recoup the cost of research and development and reap profits.95 In 1992, 
the Commission introduced the Supplementary Protection Certificate 
(“SPC”) to extend the monopoly period of pioneer medications by an 
additional five years from their time of marketing, thereby allowing up to 
a fifteen-year effective monopoly period for pioneer drugs.96  
 
 
European Court of Justice. Case 181/82, Roussel Laboratories BV v. Netherlands, 1983 E.C.R. 03849; 
Case 238/82, Duphar v. Netherlands, 1984 E.C.R. 00523.  
 90. EU PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that Thalidomide was hailed 
as a breakthrough nausea aid, but reportedly led to birth defects in tens of thousands of infants).  
 91. Council Directive 65/65, On the Approximation of Provisions Laid Down by Law, 
Regulation or Administrative Action Relating to Medicinal Products, 1965 O.J. (L22) 369 (EC).  
 92. EU PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION, supra note 8, at 5. 
 93. Commission Regulation 2309/93, Laying Down Community Procedures for the 
Authorization and Supervision of Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing 
a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 1 (EC); see also 
European Medicines Agency, About the EMEA—Structure, http://www.EMEA.europa.eu/htms/ 
aboutus/emeaoverview.htm. To put pharmaceuticals on the market, manufacturers submit an 
application to the EMEA for an evaluation, carried out by its subsidiary, the Committee for Medicinal 
Products for Human Use. The Committee requires tests for safety and efficacy, resulting in a “positive 
opinion” which then is sent to the European Commission to make the opinion into an authorization for 
the Common Market. For a more general discussion, see Mrazek & Mossialos, supra note 87. 
 94. Mrazek & Mossialos, supra note 87.  
 95. EU PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION, supra note 8, at 121. 
 96. Id. See also Council Regulation 1768/92, O.J. (L 182) (EEC). For a recent update on changes 
in the statutory pharmaceutical regime in Europe, see Markus Hartmann & Florence Hartman-
Vareilles, Recent Developments in European Pharmaceutical Law 2004: A Legal Point of View, 39 
DRUG INFO. J. 193 (2005).  
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Also like the United States, the European Union has a strong system of 
competition laws, contained in articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.97 The 
Commission has become increasingly rigorous in its enforcement of 
competition laws in the pharmaceutical markets, particularly against 
pioneer drug manufacturers seeking to maintain their dominance against 
generic drug manufacturers in a manner the Commission finds unfair.98 
In spite of a markedly different system that makes extensive use of 
price regulation, Europe has consistently been productive in the creation of 
many new pharmaceuticals.99 However, the differential regulations across 
the Common Market have created a number of “low [research and 
development] intensive, ‘national’, small pharmaceutical companies.”100 
These small firms exist only in one Member State and do no research and 
development of their own, suggesting a fragmented market, lacking the 
competitive dynamics that promote pharmaceutical innovation.101 These 
small companies exist only in European states as a result of the system of 
overregulation—price fixing that protects brand-name manufacturers by 
requiring pharmacies and consumers to buy the branded medications; their 
market share remains the same regardless of the expiration of patents that 
would produce generic competition in other Member States.102  
 
 
 97. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 
145, arts. 81–82. See also Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained 
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 81, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/ 
oj/dat/2004/c_101/c_10120040427en00810096.pdf. 
 98. By 1994, the Commission was willing to take on brand-name drug manufacturer Tetra Pak, a 
monopolist engaging in “egregious anti-competitive practices” in the pharmaceutical industry, but did 
not impose significant fines and limited its ruling to extreme circumstances. Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak 
Int’l SA v. European Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-755, ¶ 244.  
 In 2005, the Commission prosecuted AstraZeneca for attempting to block or delay the entry into 
the market of a generic competitor to its anti-ulcer drug. Commission Decision 2004/310/EC (Case 
COMP/M.1806-AstraZeneca/Novartis) O.J. (L 110) 1. The Commission found AstraZeneca’s actions 
to be a violation of its dominant position in the market, explaining that 
misleading regulators to gain longer protection acts as a disincentive to innovate, and is a 
serious infringement of European Union competition rules. Health care systems throughout 
Europe rely on generic drugs to keep costs down. Patients benefit from lower prices. By 
preventing generic competition, AstraZeneca kept Losec prices artificially high. Moreover, 
competition from generic products after a patent has expired itself encourages innovation in 
pharmaceuticals. 
Id. 
 99. GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 10, at 33–35 (explaining that Europe produced sixteen of 
the top fifty NCEs from 1996 to 1999, and that Europeans were also responsible for the filing of over 
forty percent of the patents for pharmaceuticals from 1988 to 1997).  
 100. Id. at 57.  
 101. Id. Also see generally Lacy Glenn Thomas, III, Implicit Industrial Policy: The Triumph of 
Britain and the Failure of France in Global Pharmaceuticals, 3 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (1994). 
 102. Id. at 58.  
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V. COMPARING THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION REGIME TO THAT OF THE UNITED 
STATES  
The European example provides some insights into the American 
pharmaceutical regulatory regime when considering the possible effects of 
price regulation and the use of generics. The European regulatory scheme 
has approached the new marketing period of medicines with an increasing 
disparity of “innovation” compared to the United States, yet provides 
drugs to most consumers at significantly lower costs.103 European price 
regulation stimulates the entry of generics into that market.104 European 
legal constraints thus show a preference for low pharmaceutical prices, 
particularly in those states whose governments favor the purchasing of 
generic substitutes. In contrast, the American system lends itself to the 
consolidation of manufacturing behind the major brand-name drug 
producers, who invest the rents taken from exclusivity into marketing and 
innovation through re-marketing. If Europe is any guide, the operation of a 
pharmaceutical price control regime mandating the use of generics would 
provide immediate savings to American consumers.105 A regime that 
requires generic substitutions from doctors or pharmacists may be the only 
way to aid a largely uninformed public that has been misguided by the 
branded pharmaceuticals’ advertising campaigns.  
However, the economic competitiveness of the pharmaceutical markets 
in Europe may be curtailed by the wide range of industrial policies chosen 
by European states.106 Relative prices across Europe have varied widely in 
response to different regulatory environments, making effective marketing 
of products exceedingly difficult and corresponding economic 
opportunities unpredictable.107 Thus, these varying regimes led to an 
“incomplete market” whose status quo is retained for political fear of what 
 
 
 103. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, OECD HEALTH DATA 
2001: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 30 COUNTRIES (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/61/0,3343,en_2649_ 34631_1913405_119690_1_1_1,00.html. While the number of NCEs 
being developed in the United States each year has stayed relatively stagnant, those being developed in 
Europe have decreased by fifty percent, falling behind the United States from 1999 to 2003. Id. 
Prescription drug prices are higher in the United States than in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
and Italy. By contrast, over-the-counter medications are cheaper in the United States than in those 
countries. SCHACTER, supra note 62, at 231. 
 104. GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 10, at 26.  
 105. Burstall, supra note 1, at 72–81.  
 106. See GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 10, at 66. 
 107. Burstall, supra note 1, at 78–79. 
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a more efficient, Europe-wide market could bring.108 An inefficient 
pharmaceutical market resulting from differentiating industrial policy and 
mandatory pricing caused an inefficient and fragmented industry in 
Europe. This may provide a lesson to the United States that developing a 
sub-national, state-based industrial policy, under the backdrop of our 
current national generic regulatory system with its resulting price 
differentiation based on locality, would be a mistaken approach, providing 
dispersed short-term savings at the expense of market efficiency. 
Expanding the current approach to health care savings on a state-based 
system could result in many of the same inefficiencies and uncompetitive 
market players seen in Europe.109 
Although the dominant trends in the pharmaceutical industry will 
remain economizing and cutting operational costs, the downsides of 
pharmaceutical price regulation are evident in the reduction in incentives 
to create those innovative NCEs and new medicines that might otherwise 
be possible. Because the public sector and universities are generally not 
equipped to be the sole promoters of product innovation, private industry 
must take the lead, be it within Europe or from the United States.110 Thus a 
system that values price protection may not result in the same quantities of 
innovative products from a robust private sector in a price-competitive 
environment. The mere prospect of a comparable form of price regulation 
added to the American regulatory regime has elicited negative reactions, 
with suggestions of an instantaneous and irrevocable downturn in research 
and development.111 Perhaps consumers in the deregulated American 
marketplace value innovative scientific cures at all cost and are unwilling 
to trade breakthrough cancer cures for lower prices in mandated 
generics.112 More likely, however, American consumers would value a 
 
 
 108. EU PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION, supra note 8, at 189–92, 208 (explaining that a single 
market would “more than likely result in increased prices,” but it would make a “stronger European 
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TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at A18.  
 110. SCHACTER, supra note 62, at 228. 
 111. EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 68 (“The researchers found that R&D spending will drop by 
nearly 40% over the next two decades, resulting in a loss of nearly $300 billion in R&D and 277 
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major revamping of the pharmaceutical scheme, adopting models from 
Europe. 
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